Talk:Systemic regulator

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This paper presents evidence that accounting (or flow-of-fund) macroeconomic models helped anticipate the credit crisis and economic recession. Equilibrium models ubiquitous in mainstream policy and research did not. This study identifies core differences, traces their intellectual pedigrees, and includes case studies of both types of models. It so provides constructive recommendations on revising methods of financial stability assessment. Overall, the paper is a plea for research into the link between accounting concepts and practices and macro economic outcomes.

Our second priority was creating a more stable financial system by strengthening supervision and regulation of financial firms.

That necessarily begins with higher capital requirements. The most important thing to lowering risk in the financial system is stronger capital cushions.

The Committee is well aware that in the years leading up to this crisis, as rising asset prices, particularly in housing, concealed a sharp deterioration of some of the underwriting standards for loans, risks built up substantially while capital cushions did not. The nation's largest financial firms, already highly leveraged, became increasingly dependent on unstable sources of short-term funding.

These firms did not plan for the potential demands on their liquidity during a crisis. And when asset prices started to fall and market liquidity froze, they were forced to pull back from lending, limiting credit for households and businesses.

Looking back it is clear that regulators did not require firms to hold sufficient capital to cover risks from their trading assets, high-risk loans, and off-balance sheet commitments.

Under our plan, that will change. Financial firms will be required to follow the example of millions of families across the country that are saving more money as a precaution against bad times. They will be required to keep more capital and liquid assets on hand and, importantly, the biggest, most interconnected firms will be required to keep even bigger cushions.

Now, higher capital requirements are an important step towards longer-term stability, but they are only the first step.

While many of the financial firms at the center of this crisis were under some form of federal supervision and regulation, that oversight did not do enough. A patchwork of supervisory responsibility, loopholes that allowed some institutions to shop for the weakest regulator, and the rise of new financial institutions and instruments that were almost entirely outside the government's supervisory framework left regulators largely blind to emerging dangers and without the tools needed to address them.

That is why we propose evolving the Federal Reserve's authority to create a single point of accountability for the consolidated supervision of all large, interconnected firms whose failure could threaten the stability of the system, regardless of whether they own an insured depository institution. This is a role the Fed plays today, given its supervision and regulation of bank holding companies, including all major U.S. commercial and investment banks.

While our plan gives some new authority – along with necessary accountability – to the Fed, it also takes some away. That includes transferring the Fed's consumer protection responsibility to the CFPA and requiring the Fed to receive written approval from the Secretary of the Treasury before exercising its emergency lending authority.

Alongside the new role played by the Fed, there must also be a mechanism to look at the system as a whole for dangers, given that risk can emerge from almost any quarter.

That is why we are proposing a Financial Services Oversight Council to bring together the heads of all of the major federal financial regulatory agencies. This Council will improve coordination of policy and resolution of disputes among the agencies. It will have a significant consultative role to play in helping preserve financial stability. And, most importantly, it will have the power to gather information from any firm or market to help identify emerging risks.

Improving the supervision and regulation of financial firms broadly also requires reducing the ability of depository institutions to choose their regulator and regulatory framework. To address this problem, we have proposed eliminating the thrift and thrift holding company charter and removing other loopholes in the Bank Holding Company Act.



This paper considers channels by which tax distortions are likely to have contributed to excessive leveraging and other financial market problems that came to the forefront during the crisis. As stressed in IMF (2009a), most tax systems embody strong tax incentives for corporations (including banks and other financial institutions) to use debt rather than equity finance—interest is deductible against corporate tax but equity returns are not—and, in some cases, for individuals to do so too. Tax distortions have also encouraged the development of complex financial instruments and structures, including extensive use of low-tax jurisdictions.1 Some argue that taxation, including of executive compensation, may have contributed to excessive risk-taking. Of course tax distortions did not trigger the current crisis, in the sense that there are no obvious tax changes that explain, for instance, rapid increases in debt in recent years. But tax distortions are likely to have contributed to the crisis by leading to levels of debt higher than would otherwise have been the case. Early alleviation of these distortions could have helped offset the factors that over the last few years led to higher leverage and other financial market problems.

  • Adult Swim Only PIMCO discussion about leverage and CDS, CLO, CDOs, May 2005
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