Banking supervision

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Who Disciplines Bank Managers?

"We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ‘laboratory setting’ by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders’ ability to fire an executive.

Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt.

We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance."

Korea

A bill to hand South Korea’s central bank a role in supervising banks cleared a big hurdle on Monday, earning immediate rebuke from the top financial regulator.

The National Assembly’s powerful finance committee gave its blessing to the bill allowing the Bank of Korea to conduct its own probe into banks as part of a new role aimed at maintaining financial stability.

The central bank lost its powers to supervise financial institutions in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. They were handed to the newly created regulator, the Financial Services Commission (FSC).

"It is a pity and it is regrettable that the revised Bank of Korea act passed the finance committee,” FSC chairman Chin Dong-soo told reporters. “The government is opposed to this revised act.”

Banks also criticised the bill, saying it would add to their burdens.

"Giving grounds for the Bank of Korea to require a joint investigation in relation to financial market stability will increase banks’ workload and harm their management efficiency,” the Korea Federation of Banks said in a statement.

The bill still has to be approved by the judiciary committee before a full parliamentary vote.

Under current law, the central bank must go through the FSC and its implementing agency, the Financial Supervisory Service, if it wants access to detailed information on financial firms, including their foreign securities holdings and other investments.

Pressure to change the law comes after criticism last year that the authorities were slow in dealing with market jitters about the foreign debt exposure of local banks.

How the Fed let small banks take on too much debt, then fail

The Federal Reserve Board, chastised for regulatory inaction that contributed to the subprime mortgage meltdown, also missed a chance to prevent much of the financial chaos ravaging hundreds of small- and mid-sized banks.

In early 2005, at a time when the housing market was overheated and economic danger signs were in the air, the Fed had an opportunity to put a damper on risk taking among banks, especially those that had long been bedrocks of smaller cities and towns across the nation.

But the Fed rejected calls from one of the nation's top banking regulators, a professional accounting board and the Fed's own staff for curbs on the banks' use of special debt securities to raise capital that was allowing them to mushroom in size.

Then-Chairman Alan Greenspan and the other six Fed governors voted unanimously to reaffirm a nine-year-old rule allowing liberal use of what are called trust-preferred securities.

This was like a magic bullet for community banks that had few ways to raise capital without issuing more common stock and diluting their share price. The Fed allowed the banks to count the securities as debt, even while counting the proceeds as reserves. Banks were then free to borrow and lend in amounts 10 times or more than the value of the securities being issued.

The Fed supervised about 1,400 bank-holding companies, the bulk of them parent companies of community banks.

Data emerging from the carnage of collapsed and teetering banks leaves little doubt that the Fed rule, and regulators' failure to adequately police the issuance of these securities, created big cracks to the already shaky foundations of the nation's banking system.

A four-month McClatchy inquiry found that the Fed rule enabled Wall Street to encourage many community banks to take on huge debt and to plunge the borrowings into risky real estate loans.

In a Winter 2010 Supervisory Insights report published Wednesday, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. confirmed McClatchy's findings. Sandra Thompson, the FDIC's director of supervision, said that "institutions relying on these instruments took more risks and failed more often than those that did not include the use of" trust-preferred securities.

In its supervisory report, however, the FDIC didn't criticize the Fed directly.

Adding to the problems, investment banks aggressively pooled these community-bank securities into complex bonds — much like the complex mortgage bonds that nearly brought down the financial system in 2008.

The consequences were devastating.

As of Sept. 30, the FDIC had 860 small banks on its "watch list" for possible failure. The issuance of the special securities to boost lending helps explain the staggering 324 bank failures between 2008 and mid-December.

Of those failed banks, the parent companies of at least 136 of them issued and later defaulted on more than $5 billion of the special securities.

The picture is sure to grow uglier in 2011.

That's because Fitch Ratings, which rates the likelihood of bond defaults, said that another 380 bank holding companies that issued $7.1 billion of the securities have exercised their rights to defer paying interest to investors for up to five years. Deferrals historically have preceded defaults.

Defaults and deferrals even contributed to at least three dozen failures by banks that bought the complex bonds — as much as $312 million by the Riverside National Bank of Florida alone.

The failures collectively have already left more than $1 billion of the complex bonds on the books of the FDIC's industry-funded bank rescue fund. McClatchy obtained this sum through the Freedom of Information Act.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is now investigating how securities firms hawked some of the complex bonds in a poorly understood, $55 billion offshore market for debt issued by banks, insurers and real estate trusts — a market that's only now becoming clear.

The demise of two banks on Sept. 11, 2009, the eighth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, illustrates how the community bank securities blindsided issuers and buyers alike.

From 2003 to 2007, Chicago-based Corus Bancshares generated more than $400 million in capital by making more than a dozen offerings of the 30-year bonds, partly to fuel its Corus Bank unit's dive into the sizzling market for condominiums, especially in Florida. The bank's officers felt the fever, as their total condo construction loans shot up from $447.6 million to $3.46 billion.

"Everyone was making money hand over fist," said John Barkidjija, who was promoted to serve as Corus' chief credit risk officer months before the bank failed. "We were in a risky business. We were doing bigger and bigger loans. We were concentrated geographically, and if there was a downturn, it could be bad."

In September 2009, two years after U.S. credit markets began to freeze and home prices began to plummet, Barkidjija said, "We had our own 9/11."

The parent of Venture Bank — a Dupont, Wash., lender that began as a credit union in 1932 — created a cash infusion for its bank by issuing $21 million of the special securities. Cranking out loans to real estate developers, the bank's assets grew from $752 million to $1.1 billion between 2005 and 2008. Venture officers commissioned the construction of a multi-story, $8 million headquarters.

But Venture also invested more than $42 million in the bank bonds that bank examiners would require them to write off. An FDIC report shows that Venture also lost $42.5 million in investments when the government took over mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008.

Washington state bank examiners in 2008 concluded that Venture had concentrated more of its investments in real estate development loans than all but 1.5 percent of the nation's banks and thrifts.

Venture's former chief financial officer, Sandra Sager, declined to comment about the lender's collapse, which left its shiny headquarters sitting empty.

Corus and Venture were emblematic of many banks that used their newfound capital to feed the real estate bubble, helping to propel U.S. home construction from $257 billion in 1996 to $620 billion a decade later.

Other banks that left the FDIC with hefty portfolios of defaulted bonds when they failed included the Independent Bankers Bank of Springfield, Ill., and the Rainier Pacific Bank of Tacoma, Wash., each with more than $113 million, and Vantus Bank of Sioux City, Iowa, with $65 million.

William Black, a former senior federal thrift regulator, blames the Fed for an overzealous free-market focus.

"The Fed desperately wanted to believe that it didn't need to regulate and could rely instead on private market discipline," meaning banks would avoid taking excessive risks, said Black, now a professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

Instead, he said, the banks were "lending into the bubble" with money generated by the bonds, while other banks lacked the sophistication to assess the perils of buying the complex securities.

Fed officials declined to comment about this regulatory misfire. Greenspan didn't respond to a request for comment.

The outlook for trust-preferred securities went dark in mid-2007, after ratings agencies put under review for a downgrade the slices of 72 offshore deals involving complex bonds that were backed by community-bank securities. This signaled downgrades that eventually reduced these bonds to junk status.

Growing nervous that summer, an officer of one community bank dialed his broker to unload millions of dollars of the complex bonds.

The reply, recalled the now-former bank officer, came as a shock: "There's no market."

"I didn't know what to say," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of litigation fears.

He likened it to trying to sell your house and being told: "'There's no buyer . . . even if you lowered it to a dollar."

Regulators soon seized the bank.

After the Fed's 1996 vote approving their use, the special securities were a hard sell since there wasn't much of a track record. That changed in 2000 when the Wall Street firm Solomon Brothers came up with the idea of bundling securities from 30 or 40 banks and selling slices, or "tranches" of each bundle based on their investment grades.

By 2004, banks big and small had issued $77 billion of the securities, spurring lending that helped the economy rebound from the 9/11 terror attacks, but prompting a new regulatory challenge. The Fair Accounting Standards Board determined that banks should report the securities only as debt, not as capital. This meant that the banks couldn't borrow heavily against the proceeds from the issuance of the securities, curtailing banks' growth potential.

Lobbied by community bankers to reject that conclusion, the Fed proposed a formal rule that left things as they were for banks with assets under $15 billion — the community and regional banks.

FDIC officials blanched. In a nine-page letter to Greenspan, then-agency Chairman Donald Powell argued that the policy would encourage banks to take too many risks to cover the dividends they'd be expected to pay their parent companies in return for the cash.

He lamented "the unilateral decision of an important bank regulator such as the Federal Reserve to depart from established prudential standards."

At least one Fed official urged that community banks be held to more stringent standards.

The Fed rejected those appeals, overrode the accountants and kept the rule essentially intact.

By 2009, the amount of the bank-issued securities had climbed to a whopping $149 billion.

References

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